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Abstract
We consider a software vendor selling both a monopoly platform (e.g.
operating system) and an application that runs on this platform. He
may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for both the platform
and the applications. They first buy the platform and then the ap-
plications. Their utility over the horizontally differentiated applica-
tions is known only after they bought the platform. In equilibrium
the platform seller can be better off with a competitor in the applica-
tions market for three reasons. First, the platform vendor makes more
profits with his platform. Second, the competitor’s entry serves as a
credible commitment to lower prices for applications. Third, higher
ex ante expectations of product diversity lead to a higher demand for
his application. Competition may be profit enhancing even if the first
two effects are absent, i.e. the product diversity effect can be suffi-
cient. The model also gives an answer to the much debated question
why Microsoft prices MS Office significantly higher than its operating
system.
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price commitment, product diversity, Microsoft
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1 Introduction
Platforms play an important role in many markets. A platform gives two
sides (e.g. sellers and buyers) the possibility to interact (e.g. trade) with
each other. The platform owner can get part of the generated surplus.
In software markets platforms seem to play a crucial role: it would be too
costly to develop a new application for every possible combination of hard-
ware, versions of operating systems, file formats, etc.1 A software platform
provides a common interface between different applications and different
configurations of users’ systems. Hence, it enables application developers
on one side and end users on the other side to interact with each other. We
will use the term “software platform” with a very broad meaning: it can
mean an operating system (such as Windows or Linux2), a file format (e.g.
Adobe’s PDF, Microsoft Word documents, OpenOffice documents), virtual
machines (e.g. Sun’s Java Platform, Microsoft’s .NET Platform), database
access interfaces (e.g. the Structured Query Language) or game consoles
(e.g. Sony’s Playstation 2 and Microsoft’s XBox). We will consider applica-
tions running on this platform, i.e. pieces of software that are only usable
in conjunction with the platform. Examples are the spreadsheet calculation
programs MS Excel and Lotus 1-2-3 for MS Windows and the file creation
software Adobe Acrobat Standard3 and PDF Writer for the PDF file for-
mat. Two interesting observations arise when considering these examples.
First, the platform owner often also owns one or more (but not all) of the
applications running on his platform. Second, the platform owner makes
most of his profits with the applications – the platform may even be a “loss
1For a survey of the economic role of software platforms in computer-based industries
see Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee (2004) [5].
2Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee (2004) [5] note that an operating system actually con-
nects three sides: application developers, end users and hardware suppliers. We are going
to abstract away from the hardware in our model.
3The free Acrobat Reader can only display PDF files, the Standard and Professional
versions can also create files.
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leader” (as in the case of the XBox). The two-sided markets literature has
provided many interesting insights about the second observation, however,
the first observation (especially that the platform owner owns part of the
applications market) hasn’t been treated extensively. This paper looks in
more detail at the specific effects arising in markets with the aforementioned
ownership structure.
Related Literature. Our model is related to the recent strain of litera-
ture on two-sided markets. Caillaud & Jullien (2003) [2], Rochet & Tirole
(2003) [10] and Armstrong (2002) [1] consider platform owners as intermedi-
aries who help matching a continuum of sellers and buyers. The focus in this
literature is usually on the platform. Nocke, Peitz & Stahl (2004) [8] look
at the impact of ownership structures on platform size and product variety.
They consider the cases where either all sellers (application vendors in our
terminology) or none of them own the platform. Hagiu (2004) [7] considers
the effects of commitment to a platform price.
The question considered in this paper has similarities to the questions
investigated in the network externalities literature. Parker & Van Alstyne
(2000) [9] consider a platform owner who induces more competition in the
applications market to get higher profits in the platform market. Econo-
mides (1996) [4] looks at a monopolist who is willing to induce competition
as a means of committing to higher quantities. Our model also shows the
effects described by Parker & Van Alstyne and Economides (with the dif-
ference that it has price and not quantity commitment), but introduces a
third effect: the application diversity effect.
This paper discusses a different question, but bears resemblance to the
second-sourcing literature which considers a monopolist (e.g. a patent holder)
who is willing to allow competition in order to commit to lower future prices.
Farrell & Gallini (1988) [6] look at a two-period game in which a monopo-
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list is willing to accept Bertrand competition and zero profits in the second
period in order to convince consumers to incur high setup costs and buy his
product in the first period.
In our model we look at the specific setup of a platform owner who also
owns an application running on his platform. An independent firm considers
developing a further, horizontally differentiated application for the platform.
Consumers are heterogeneous in both their preferences for the platform and
the applications. They buy the platform at the first stage of the game, at
the second stage they get to know their preferences about the applications.
As long as consumers do not know their preferences over applications,
they form expectations over their utility derived from purchasing the appli-
cations. The higher the expectations, the more willing consumers are to buy
the platform. An entrant in the applications market increases consumers’
expectations and thus demand for the platform. At the same time he takes
away market shares from the former monopolist in the applications market.
This paper will argue that the positive effect of competition for the mo-
nopolist may offset the negative effect. We will also illustrate the different
channels through which the positive effect of competition works.
This article is structured in the following way. Section 2 describes the
setup of the basic model. Sections 3 and 4 treat the two cases where the po-
tential entrant either stays out of the market or enters. Section 5 compares
the monopolist’s profits for the two cases. We will show that the platform
monopolist may be better off with a competitor in the applications market.
This has three reasons. First, the platform vendor makes more profits with
his platform. Second, the competitor’s entry serves as a credible commit-
ment to lower prices for applications. Third, higher ex ante expectations of
product diversity lead to a higher demand for his application. In order to
show that the third effect can be sufficient, the first two effects are elimi-
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nated in Sections 6 and 7. Section 6 removes the first effect by assuming that
the platform vendor cannot make profits with the platform (because he has
to give it away for free). Section 7 eliminates the second effect as well with
the assumption that the platform vendor gives away the platform for free
and can credibly commit to low application prices without a competitor. In
Section 7 we make some simplifying assumptions about the distribution of
consumer preferences in order to keep the model tractable, however, it can
be shown for numeric examples that the basic results carry over to a setup
without the simplifications.
Section 8 discusses the monopolist’s optimal pricing of the platform and
the application for the example of Microsoft Windows and Office.
2 Model
Consider a software market with two firms, A and B. Firm A produces two
goods: a platform and an application. B considers developing an application
for A’s platform (see Fig. 1). B is the only firm capable of producing
its application, either because of its unique expertise in programming this
piece of software or because of legal issues (e.g. copyright laws, patents
or noncompetition clauses for its lead developers). B’s application is usable
with A’s platform only. One can think of the platform as being an operating
system (e.g. MS Windows) and the applications being software written for
this operating system (e.g. MS Excel, Lotus 1-2-3). Another possibility is
the platform being a file standard (e.g. PDF – Portable Document Format)
and the applications being software for creating files complying with this
standard (e.g. Adobe Acrobat Standard, PDF Writer).
Now let us consider the potential buyers of the platform and the applica-
tions. We assume a continuum of consumers with heterogeneous preferences
over the platform y ∈ [0,∞) and over the applications x ∈ [0, 1] (see Fig.
2). One can imagine y as the distance of a consumer from the platform: the
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A
A B
Platform
Application
Figure 1: Products offered by A and B
further one is (i.e. the greater y), the less willing one is to buy the plat-
form.4 x is the location of the consumer in a Hotelling competition between
applications A and B with fixed firm location where A is located at 0 and B
at 1. This means that consumers with a small x are more willing to buy A
and less willing to buy B than consumers with a large x. Consumers’ utility
is set to 0 for the case they do not buy the platform (and hence cannot
buy any of the applications either), v0 = s − p − y if they buy the platform
without any applications5, vA = v0 + sA − pA − tx if they buy the platform
with application A and vB = v0 + sB − pB − t(1 − x) if they buy it with
application B. s is the intrinsic value of the platform, p is the price of the
platform, sA and sB are the gross utilities (without “transportation costs”)
consumers derive from applications A and B respectively, pA and pB are
the prices of the applications and t represents the “transportation costs” in
the choice of the application.6 We will assume that consumers learn their
preferences over applications x only after having bought the platform.7 Like
4Or one can consider y to be the outside option of a consumer as in Nocke, Peitz &
Stahl (2004) [8].
5The possibility of buying the platform with neither application A nor application B
can be justified by the idea that the platform is bundled with an application or that there
is a further application C which is not competing with applications A and B.
6I.e. the higher the “transportation costs” the less willing consumers are to buy an
application which is further away from their preferred type of application.
7This can be a learning by doing effect: only trying different applications can show
which is suitable for one’s own needs. Alternatively one can consider applications A and
B as future releases of software, one doesn’t know one’s preferences about software which
hasn’t been released yet.
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in the standard Hotelling setup, we assume that consumers cannot or do not
want to buy both applications.
We further assume a constant density of consumers ρ(x, y) = α for 0 ≤
x ≤ 1 and y ≥ 0 and ρ(x, y) = 0 otherwise. (For the application pricing
part we only need the assumption of uniformity over x, i.e. ρ(x, y) = ρ(y)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.8)
To simplify the description of the model we will call all consumers with
the same y a consumer unit. (An alternative interpretation of the model is
that one consumer has a specific y and stochastic preferences over the appli-
cations determined by x. Then x is a random variable uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1 and is only known to consumers in stage 2. According to
this interpretation a consumer unit is equivalent to a consumer.)
ρ(x, y)dxdy
x
y
0 1
Figure 2: Distribution of consumers’ preference parameters x (applications)
and y (platform)
We will consider the following timing:
• Stage 0: A already has a platform and an application, B decides
whether to enter,
• Stage 1: A sets price for platform, consumers buy platform,
8One could easily extend the platform pricing part with a stepwise uniform density,
e.g. ρ(y) = α1 for 0 ≤ y < y1 and ρ(y) = α2 for y ≥ y1.
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• Stage 2: A and B set prices for applications, consumers learn their x
and buy applications.
We will first consider the case where B decides not to enter (A thus
having a monopoly both in the platform and the applications market) and
set up and solve the model backwards.
In the second case we consider the situation where B enters and solve
the model backwards again. If B’s revenues from entering are higher than
the fixed costs it incurs from developing the application, B will be willing
to enter.
3 No Market Entry by Competitor B
We will first consider profits from application sales and consumer surplus
per consumer unit at stage 2.9 Afterwards, at stage 1, we will look at the
platform choice of consumers and thus determine the number of consumer
units. Assuming subgame perfection, at stage 2 players take the outcomes
of stage 1 as given and do not have to fulfill any promises or threats.
3.1 Stage 2
Consider stage 2 of the case where B doesn’t enter. In this case A is a mo-
nopolist in the applications market as well. Let us only consider consumers
who have bought the platform. They have to decide whether they want to
buy application A additionally to the platform or want to use the platform
alone. Consumers not buying the application derive utility v0 from the us-
age of the platform alone. Consumers buying application A have a utility
of vA. To simplify analysis we will only consider excess utility compared to
v0: excess utility for using the platform alone is 0, for using application A
vA − v0 = sA − pA − tx.
9According to the alternative interpretation where one consumer has a specific y and a
stochastic x, we calculate ex ante expected consumer surplus per consumer. Because the
x of a consumer isn’t known to the firms even at stage 2, they maximize expected profits
per consumer.
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Now let us consider a consumer unit whose members have bought the
platform.10 According to the assumption made previously consumers are
uniformly distributed along the x-axis (i.e. the density of consumers at
point (x, y) is ρ(x, y) = ρ(y) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and y ≥ 0), therefore we get
a one-sided version of the standard fixed location Hotelling setup where a
monopolist sells goods to consumers with heterogeneous preferences.
We will assume that A has an incentive to sell to all consumers (Fig. 3).
For this, we need to assume that transportation costs are low enough (or
that the gross utility derived from application A is high enough):
sA ≥ 2t. (1)
Proposition 1. If the gross utility derived from application A is high enough
(sA ≥ 2t), the monopolist will sell to all consumers and will set the outermost
consumer indifferent between buying and not buying.
For a formalization and a proof of this proposition and for a treatment of
the alternative case where the monopolist doesn’t sell to consumers far away
from him see Appendix A. The effect we intend to show is even stronger in
the alternative case.
With full market coverage, the monopolist will set the outermost con-
sumer indifferent between buying his application or using the platform with-
out the application, i.e. for x̂ = 1
sA − pA − tx̂ = 0
where x̂ is the location of the indifferent consumer (see Fig. 3)
Thus, under the assumption of full market coverage, we get the optimal
price:
p∗A = sA − t. (2)
10Note that x isn’t known in the first period, therefore only perceived heterogeneity in y
exists for consumers when deciding whether to buy the platform. In pure strategies either
all consumers with a specific y buy the platform or none.
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t
sA − pA
vA − v0
0 x̂ = 1
Figure 3: Monopolist A selling the application to all consumers who have
bought the platform. The shaded area under the curve denotes the consumer
surplus.
For equilibrium profits per consumer unit from sales of the application we
get
π∗A = p
∗
Ax̂ = sA − t.
under the assumption of zero marginal costs.
For the sake of clarity, profits per consumer unit at stage 2 will be de-
noted with a lower case π, total profits at stage 1 will be denoted with a
upper case Π.
The consumer surplus per consumer unit is the integral of consumers’
utilities over x, as denoted in the shaded area in Fig. 3:
EU =
∫ x̂
0
(sA − p∗A − tx)dx.
Substituting p∗A and x̂ we get
EU =
t
2
.
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We denote consumer surplus with EU because it is the utility that con-
sumers expect to derive from the purchase of the application when they form
expectations at stage 1.
Having calculated the outcome of stage 2, we can proceed to stage 1,
where consumers buy the platform.
3.2 Stage 1
At stage 1 consumers decide whether to buy the platform. As they do not
know their preferences for the application (i.e. their x) they form expecta-
tions over x. Their expected utility for buying the platform is
s − p − y + EU. (3)
There is an indifferent consumer unit ŷ for whom
s − p − ŷ + EU = 0. (4)
(see Fig. 4)
1
s + EU − p
0 ŷ y
Utility of Consumers
Figure 4: Platform Choice
One can get the number of consumer units (i.e. all consumers with
the same y) who are willing to buy the platform by integrating the density
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function from 0 to ŷ:
N =
∫ ŷ
0
∫
1
0
ρ(x, y)dxdy = αŷ = α(s + EU − p). (5)
Firm A makes profits from selling its platform (pN) and its application
at stage 2 (π∗AN). The overall profit of firm A is thus
Π = pN + π∗AN (6)
and the profit maximization problem
Π∗ = max
p
N(p + π∗A). (7)
The profit maximizing price p∗ for the platform is
p∗ =
1
2
(s + EU − π∗A)
or, after substituting,
p∗ =
1
2
(
s +
3
2
t − sA
)
. (8)
p∗ is nonnegative if
s + EU ≥ π∗A. (9)
⇔
s ≥ sA −
3
2
t.
We assume that either s is sufficiently large so that condition (9) is satisfied
or that firm A has the possibility to set a negative p∗ (i.e. subsidize its
platform).11
For the number of consumer units buying the platform we get
N∗ =
α
2
(s + EU + π∗A)
11E.g. by offering free support for the platform or by offering an application C addi-
tionally to the platform for free, where C is not substitutable with applications A and
B.
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or
N∗ =
α
2
(s + sA − t).
Because both EU and π∗A are positive N
∗ is strictly positive for all nonneg-
ative values of s, therefore we don’t have to make further assumptions to
ensure that N∗ ≥ 0.
Equilibrium total profits of firm A are
Π∗ =
α
4
(s + EU + π∗A)
2 (10)
or
Π∗ =
α
4
(s + sA − t)2. (11)
3.3 Stage 0
We set B’s profits to 0 for the case that it doesn’t enter the market.
4 Market Entry by Competitor B
Now we can look at the case when B enters the market.
4.1 Stage 2
Consider stage 2 of the case where B enters. Again, let us only consider
consumers who have bought the platform. They have to decide whether they
want to buy application A or B additionally to the platform or do not want to
buy any of the applications. Consumers not buying any of the applications
derive utility v0 from the usage of the platform alone. Consumers buying
application A have a utility of vA, those buying B a utility of vB. Excess
utility for using the platform alone is 0, for using application A vA − v0 =
sA − pA − tx, for B vB − v0 = sB − pB − t(1 − x).
Now let us consider a consumer unit whose members have bought the
platform. Because of the uniform distribution of consumers’ preferences
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along the x-axis we get a standard fixed location Hotelling setup with firm
A located at x = 0 and firm B at x = 1. The only difference to the standard
model is that sA isn’t necessarily equal to sB.
Here we will assume an equilibrium as depicted in Fig. 5. To exclude
special cases we make some restrictions on the ranges of sA, sB and t:
sA + sB > 3t (12)
−3t < sA − sB < 3t. (13)
We assume that the whole market is covered (there are no consumers
who do not buy any of the applications) and that the consumer who is
indifferent between A and B has a strictly positive excess utility (Eq. (12)).
We further assume that both firms can sell strictly positive quantities of
their application (i.e. neither firm’s application is so much better than the
other’s that it could capture the whole market, Eq. (13)). See Appendix B
for a derivation of these restrictions and for a treatment of the cases where
these assumptions aren’t satisfied. As noted in subsection 3.1 comparing
these alternative cases with the cases mentioned in subsection 3.1 (full and
partial market coverage) gives us even stronger results.
Under the aforementioned conditions all consumers buy an application
(see Fig. 5). The indifferent consumer x̃ derives the same excess utility from
applications A and B:
sA − pA − tx̃ = sB − pB − t(1 − x̃) (14)
Consumers to the left of x̃ buy A, those to the right of x̃ buy B.
Demand per consumer unit for application A is
x̃ =
1
2
+
1
2t
(sA − sB + pB − pA)
and for B
1 − x̃ = 1
2
− 1
2t
(sA − sB + pB − pA).
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t
sA − pA
sB − pB
vA − v0 vB − v0
0 x̃ 1
Figure 5: Application Pricing. The shaded area denotes consumer surplus.
Profits per consumer unit from the sales of the applications are
πA = pAx̃ (15)
πB = pB(1 − x̃). (16)
We assume profit maximization in equilibrium:
p∗A = arg max
pA
πA(pA, p
∗
B) (17)
p∗B = arg max
pB
πB(p
∗
A, pB). (18)
From (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18) we get the Nash equilibrium
p∗A = t +
∆
3
(19)
p∗B = t −
∆
3
(20)
with ∆ = sA − sB. The indifferent consumer is at location
x̃∗ =
1
2
+
∆
6t
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and equilibrium profits are12
π∗A =
(
t +
∆
3
)(
1
2
+
∆
6t
)
(21)
π∗B =
(
t − ∆
3
)(
1
2
− ∆
6t
)
. (22)
The consumer surplus per consumer unit is the integral of consumers’
utilities over x, as denoted in the shaded area in Fig. 5:
EU =
∫ x̃∗
0
(sA − p∗A − tx)dx +
∫
1
x̃∗
(sB − p∗B − t(1 − x))dx, (23)
substituting p∗A, p
∗
B and x̃
∗ we get
EU =
∆2
36t
+
sA
2
+
sB
2
− 5
4
t. (24)
Again, we can use stage 2 results for stage 1.
4.2 Stage 1
As in the case where B doesn’t enter, consumers’ valuation for the platform
depends on the intrinsic value of the platform plus the expected value of the
applications at stage 2. The only difference is that here consumers anticipate
that they might buy application B instead of A at stage 2 and adjust their
expectations accordingly. Their expected utility for buying the platform is
s − p − y + EU. (25)
Consumers with y ∈ [0, ỹ] buy the platform where the location of the
indifferent consumer is given by
ỹ = s − p − EU.
The number of consumer units is
N =
∫ ỹ
0
∫
1
0
ρ(x, y)dxdy = αỹ = α(s + EU − p). (26)
12These results are consistent with the standard Hotelling model where sA = sB . In
the standard Hotelling model equilibrium prices are p∗A = p
∗
B = t and equilibrium profits
are π∗A = π
∗
B = t/2. Substituting ∆ = 0 into (19), (20), (21) and (22) gives us the same
results.
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1
s + EU − p
0 ỹ y
Utility of Consumers
Figure 6: Platform Choice
Firm A’s overall profits are still
Π = pN + π∗AN
but with a different π∗A this time.
By analogy to subsection 3.2 we get
p∗ =
1
2
(s + EU − π∗A)
Π∗ =
α
4
(s + EU + π∗A)
2 (27)
for platform price and total profits.
Substituting the values of EU and π∗A for the case where B enters the
market, we get
p∗ =
1
2
(
s − ∆
2
36t
+
1
6
sA +
5
6
sB −
7
4
t
)
(28)
and
Π∗ =
α
4
(
s +
∆2
12t
+
5
6
sA +
1
6
sB −
3
4
t
)2
. (29)
As in Section 3.2 we assume that A can either subsidize the platform or that
the condition
s ≥ ∆
2
36t
+
1
6
sA +
5
6
sB −
7
4
t (30)
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is satisfied and thus we do not have to care about the constraint p∗ ≥ 0.
Again, as in Section 3.2 N∗ is positive for nonnegative values of s.
4.3 Stage 0
Before entering the market, B anticipates revenues per consumer unit π∗B
for stage 2 and the number of consumer units N∗ buying the platform for
stage 1. If B’s total revenues π∗BN
∗ exceed its development costs fB, B will
enter the market.
Market entry condition for B:
π∗BN
∗ − fB ≥ 0. (31)
5 Comparison of Profits
Having calculated A’s profits for both cases (B enters/B doesn’t enter) we
can look at the central question of this article: Does a Monopolist Want
Competition?
We will denote A’s profits in the competition case
Π∗C =
α
4
[
s +
∆2
12t
+
5
6
sA +
1
6
sB −
3
4
t
]2
(32)
from Eq. (29). A’s profits in the case of being a monopolist are
Π∗M =
α
4
[s + sA − t]2 (33)
as calculated in Eq. (11).
The expressions in the brackets in (32) and (33) are nonnegative, there-
fore one can skip the α/4 and the square and compare the expressions in
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the brackets directly13:
Π∗C
?
> Π∗M
⇔
s +
∆2
12t
+
5
6
sA +
1
6
sB −
3
4
t
?
> s + sA −
t
2
.
By regrouping and multiplying by 12t we get
∆2 − 2t∆ − 3t2 ?> 0. (34)
As the coefficient of ∆2 is positive, the expression will be positive for very
large and very negative values of ∆. To find out whether it can be negative
in between, we have to find the roots of the polynomial in ∆. The roots are
∆1,2 = t ± 2t.
The left hand side in Eq. (34) will be negative if ∆ is between the roots −t
and 3t and positive otherwise.
Remember that we have assumed that in the competition case neither
firm can dominate the applications market (−3t < ∆ < 3t). Restricting ∆
to this relevant range we get
Π∗C < Π∗M for − t < ∆ < 3t and
Π∗C > Π∗M for − 3t < ∆ < −t.
Thus if B’s product is better than A’s (sA − sB < −t), but not good
enough to take over the whole market (sA − sB > −3t) A is better off if B
enters the market. Area I in Fig. 7 shows the combinations of sA, sB and t
for which competition is desirable for the monopolist.
13This can be seen by looking at the intermediary steps for the calculation of total first
stage profits (10) and (27): We assume that the platform has a nonnegative intrinsic value
to consumers (s ≥ 0). The consumer surplus per consumer unit EU and per consumer
unit profits from selling application A π∗2A are also both nonnegative. Thus their sum (the
expression in the brackets) has to be nonnegative as well.
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I
II
3t
sB
t 2t 3t sA
Figure 7: Areas I and II are permissible under the assumptions made (sA ≥
2t, sA +sB > 3t and −3t < sA−sB < 3t). In area I the platform monopolist
has higher profits in the competition case. (sA: quality of application A,
sB: quality of application B, t: “transportation costs”)
6 Modification: Zero Price Platform
We have seen that under certain conditions firm A is better off if firm B
enters the market. But one could argue that this doesn’t mean that he
is really happy about competition, he’s just happy about competition in
a market complementary to his platform. He still has a monopoly on the
platform and can always make money there. In an extreme case when he
cannot sell his application at all, we have the case of two complementary
goods (the platform of A/the application of B). It has already been shown
that a firm is willing to induce more competition in a complementary market.
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So what’s the difference in this paper? We can show that firm A can be
better off after a market entry of B even if it gives away its platform for free
and thus has to make its profits with its application only.
One can consider the zero price of the platform to be exogenously given
(e.g. the platform is an open-source operating system or an open standard).
Alternatively one can think of the case where the platform price p∗ cannot
be negative and the nonnegativity conditions (9) and (30) are not satisfied.
In this case the corner solution p∗ = 0 comes up.
In this alternative setup the results from stage 2 shown in the previous
sections still hold.
However, stage 1 changes.
The price of the platform is p̄ = 0. There is no optimization problem
for firms to be solved here.14 Consumers form expectations about consumer
surplus at stage 2 and decide whether to use the platform.
Note that even with zero prices not all consumers are willing to use the
platform.15
We get for the marginal consumer ỹ = s + EU and for the number of
consumer units
N = α(s + EU).
Profits for firm A are thus
Π∗ = απ∗A(s + EU).
Now we can substitute the results from stage 2 for the different cases
and compare total profits of firm 1.
14Or p̄ = p∗ = 0 is the corner solution of the optimization problem.
15This may sound counterintuitive at first sight. However we often observe it in reality:
e.g. not everyone uses the open-source operating system Linux, not everyone uses the
free browser Mozilla Firefox. Many possible explanations have been named for this phe-
nomenon: there are costs arising from the effort of installation, retraining for the usage of
the new software, migration of legacy systems, paying external staff for the maintenance
of the system, etc.
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For the case where firm B enters and there is an inner equilibrium at
stage 2. Substituting π∗A and EU gives
Π∗C = α
(
∆2
18t
+
∆
3
+
t
2
)(
s +
∆2
36t
+
sA
2
+
sB
2
− 5
4
t
)
. (35)
For the case that B doesn’t enter and A covers the whole market at stage
2 we get
Π∗M = α(sA − t)
(
s +
t
2
)
. (36)
Π∗C −Π∗M is a polynomial of fourth degree in sA and sB. An analytical
answer to the question when Π∗C − Π∗M is positive would be intractable,
however substituting different parameter values into the result shows that
at least for some parameters it can be positive. E.g. for sB = 5, t = 1 and
s = 0 we have
• Π∗C > Π∗M if 5.12 < sA < 8
• Π∗C < Π∗M if 2 < sA < 5.12.
Note that because of the restriction −3t < sA − sB < 3t made in Eq. (1)
the parameter sA can only have values in the range (2, 8). Note further that
α doesn’t change the roots of the polynomial, it merely scales the profits.
Fig. 8 shows Π∗C − Π∗M for different values of sA.
This means that under some conditions A is better off if B enters even
if A makes his profits with his applications only.
7 Modification: Zero Price Platform and Possibil-
ity of Price Commitment
We have shown that competition may be attractive for the monopolist even
if he has to make profits in the applications market alone. Now there are
only two effects of competition left: price commitment and product diversity.
In order to separate the diversity effect we will exclude the price commit-
ment effect of competition by assuming that the monopolist has a means to
commit to a price for his application.
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Figure 8: Π∗C − Π∗M for different values of sA with sB = 5, t = 1, s = 0
and α = 1. The allowed range for sA is (2, 8).
To keep the model tractable, we assume a different distribution of con-
sumer preferences: consumers are homogeneous with respect to their pref-
erences for the platform and all have the parameter value y1 as depicted in
Fig. 9. (We can show with numerical examples that our results also hold in
a setting with the constant density of consumers we assumed in the previous
sections.)
We can describe the density of consumers with the Dirac delta function
δ(·) used in physics:
ρ(x, y) =
{
δ(y − y1) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
0 otherwise.
The number of consumers between 0 and ỹ is thus
N =
∫ ỹ
0
∫
1
0
ρ(x, y)dxdy =
{
1 if ỹ ≥ y1,
0 otherwise,
i.e. either all consumers buy the platform or none. We will first look at the
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Figure 9: Consumers with homogeneous preferences y = y1 over the platform
monopoly case in this setup and then at the competition case. We will show
that it is possible that a monopolist cannot sell his platform even if he can
commit to the application price at stage 1. Then we shown that in such a
situation competition can be a remedy.
7.1 Monopoly
We assume again full market coverage, i.e. the monopolist sets the appli-
cation price such that consumers with all values of x are willing to buy
the application. However, contrary to the previous sections, the outermost
consumer (x = 1) isn’t necessarily set indifferent between buying and not
buying (see Fig. 10), because the monopolist may be willing to commit to
a lower pA at stage 1 to convince consumers to buy the platform.
For stage 2 profits and expected consumer surplus we get
πA = pA
EU = sA − pA −
t
2
.
The condition for full market coverage at stage 1 is
sA − pA ≥ t. (37)
At stage 1, consumers are willing to buy the platform if their y is not
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t
sA − pA
vA − v0
0 x̂ = 1
sA − pA − t
Figure 10: Full coverage with price commitment at stage 1. The shaded
area below the curve denotes consumer surplus.
above
ỹ = s + EU = s + sA − pA −
t
2
.
Because all consumers have y = y1, the monopolist has to commit to a
price pA at stage 1 such that
ỹ ≥ y1 (38)
to ensure that consumers are willing to buy his platform.
The profit maximization problem of the monopolist consists of setting
pA as high as possible such that conditions (37) and (38) are still satisfied.
We take the case where condition (38) is stronger that condition (37) and
the monopolist sets pA such that (38) is just binding:
y1 = s + sA − pA −
t
2
.
For the equilibrium application price we get
p∗A = s + sA −
t
2
− y1
and for overall profits
Π∗ = π∗AN
∗ = p∗A × 1 × 1 = s + sA −
t
2
− y1.
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Now let us consider the case where
y1 > s + sA −
t
2
. (39)
In this case the firm would have to set a negative price pA for the appli-
cation to convince consumers to buy its platform. Hence, in this case it is
not possible for the monopolist to get positive profits.
7.2 Competition
If B enters the market, both firms commit to application prices at stage 1.
They face the same problem as at stage 2 in the previous sections with the
additional constraint that consumers should be willing to buy the platform:
ỹ ≥ y1 (40)
where ỹ = s + EU is the maximal distance at which consumers are still
willing to buy the platform.
We consider the case where (40) is non-binding. In this case we can
use the results obtained in the previous sections, the only difference is that
prices are set at stage 1 and not at stage 2. In equilibrium stage 2 profits
and expected consumer surplus are
π∗A =
(
t +
∆
3
)(
1
2
+
∆
6t
)
π∗B =
(
t − ∆
3
)(
1
2
− ∆
6t
)
EU =
∆2
36t
+
sA
2
+
sB
2
− 5
4
t (41)
as in subsection 4.1.
Firm A’s profits are
Π∗ = π∗AN
∗ = π∗A × 1.
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7.3 Comparison of Profits
In the case where the monopolist cannot achieve positive profits, but with
competition profits are strictly positive, firm A is (trivially) better off with
competition.
This case occurs for parameter values which satisfy both conditions (39)
and (40). Proposition 2 states when both conditions can be satisfied simul-
taneously.
Proposition 2. For ∆ ∈ (−3t, (9 − 6
√
3)t) conditions (39) and (40) can
both be satisfied at once if neither firm dominates the market.
Proof. Substituting (41) into (40) gives
y1 ≤
∆2
36t
+
sA
2
+
sB
2
− 5
4
t.
Combining this with (39) yields
s + sA −
t
2
< y1 ≤
∆2
36t
+
sA
2
+
sB
2
− 5
4
t.
The range of y1 which allows for both conditions to be satisfied is non-empty
if
s + sA −
t
2
<
∆2
36t
+
sA
2
+
sB
2
− 5
4
t
⇔
∆2 − 18t∆ − 27t2 > 0. (42)
The roots of the left-hand side of (42) are
∆1,2 = (9 ± 6
√
3)t ≈ {−1.4t, 19.4t}.
For values of ∆ not between the roots ∆1 and ∆2 Eq. (42) is satisfied.
Combining this with the assumption that neither firm dominates the market
(−3t < ∆ < 3t, see Eq. (13)) we get
−3t < ∆ < (9 − 6
√
3)t.
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8 Applying the Results: Pricing of MS Windows
vs. MS Office
An often asked question during the anti-trust case against Microsoft was
why Microsoft Windows is much cheaper than Microsoft Office, even though
Microsoft has a monopoly in the operating systems market.
As Economides & Viard (2000) [3] note there have been difficulties an-
swering this question.
Our model gives a possible answer to this question.
We want to explain why the price of MS Windows is lower than the price
of MS Office, i.e. why
p∗ < p∗A (43)
in our model.
We will first consider the monopoly and then the competition case.
8.1 Monopoly
Substituting the results obtained in Section 3 (Eqs. (2) and (8)) into p∗ < p∗A
yields
s +
3
2
t − sA < sA − t
⇔
s +
5
2
t < 2sA.
I.e. if the gross utility sA derived from the application is sufficiently large
compared to the intrinsic value s of the platform16, it is optimal for the
monopolist to charge more for the application than for the platform. Fur-
thermore, lower “transportation costs” t mean that consumers are less het-
erogeneous with respect to their preferences over applications and it is thus
easier for A to charge close consumers a higher price for the application
without losing the consumers who are further away.
16e.g. because setup costs for the platform are higher than for the application
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8.2 Competition
One can do the same comparison for the competition case. Substituting the
results from Section 4 (Eqs. (19) and (28)) into p∗ < p∗A gives
1
2
(
s − ∆
2
36t
+
1
6
sA +
5
6
sB −
7
4
t
)
< t +
∆
3
,
regrouping yields
s <
15
4
t +
∆2
36t
+
sA
6
− sB
2
. (44)
For the allowed ranges of sA, sB and t the right-hand side of (44) is increasing
in sA, decreasing in sB and increasing in t.
Hence, we get the results that Microsoft is willing to price Windows
higher than Office if 1. the intrinsic value s of Windows is sufficiently low,
2. the substitutability of Office and competing applications is sufficiently
low (i.e. t is sufficiently large), 3. the gross utility derived from Office sA is
sufficiently high and 4. the gross utility derived from competing products
sB is sufficiently low.
9 Conclusions
If a potential application of an innovative competitor is better than its own
application (but not too much better) a platform owning monopolist is better
off if the competitor enters. He will lose market shares to the competitor,
but the growth of the applications market will offset this effect and lead to
higher overall profits. This may be an explanation why Microsoft encourages
third party developers to develop software for Windows even if it competes
with its own applications.17
We have furthermore shown that for certain parameter combinations the
platform owner can be better off after an entry of a competitor in the ap-
17One could argue that Microsoft considers its applications a “loss-leader” and prefers
making money with the operating system. However, this is inconsistent with the obser-
vation that the price of MS Office is much higher than the price of MS Windows and the
market share of the Office suite and the operating system are approximately equal.
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plications market even if he can only earn profits in the applications market
itself (e.g. because the platform is an open file standard or an open source
operating system). This is a possible explanation of Adobe’s strategy to
open its PDF file format. If users want to create PDF files, they have the
choice between Adobe Acrobat Standard and a large number of commercial
(e.g. PDF Writer) and free (e.g. PDF Creator) software. Adobe lost market
shares in the PDF creation application market to competitors, but the mar-
ket grew sufficiently to offset this effect. Our model can also explain why
commercial firms like Oracle and IBM have invested significant resources
in the open source operating system Linux instead of developing an own
proprietary operating system.18
We have further shown for a simplified distribution of consumers’ pref-
erences (homogeneity in platform preferences y) that the product diversity
effect of competition is sufficient to increase the profits of the platform ven-
dor. We have shown this by introducing the assumptions of a zero price
platform and of the possibility of price commitment, and thus eliminated
the complementary goods effect and the price commitment effect of compe-
tition.
Finally, we have given a possible explanation for the observation that
MS Office costs significantly more than MS Windows.
18IBM did of course take the effort to develop proprietary operating systems for Intel
based PCs (IBM DOS and OS/2) but they haven’t been successful with it.
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Appendix
A Alternative Cases of Monopoly
If B doesn’t enter, A is a monopolist at stage 2. Here two possibilities
exist: if sA is sufficiently large (sA ≥ 2t) A will serve all consumers (full
market coverage, see Fig. 11(a)), otherwise (sA < 2t) A will charge such a
high price that some of the consumers will not buy the application (partial
market coverage, Fig. 11(b)).
x̂
(a) Full Market Coverage
x̂
(b) Partial Market Coverage
Figure 11: Cases of monopolistic pricing by A. The vertical axis denotes
excess utility vA − v0 derived from the usage of application A.
We will derive the condition that separate the two cases.
Firm A’s profits from application sales are
πA = pAx̂
where x̂ denotes the location of the consumer furthest away from A who is
still willing to buy the application. If only part of the consumers buys the
application x̂ is the indifferent consumer with
sA − pA − tx̂ = 0
⇔
x̂ =
sA − pA
t
.
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If all consumers are willing to buy the platform, i.e. even the consumer at
location 1 has a non-negative utility from buying the platform
sA − pA − t × 1 ≥ 0
and x̂ is equal to 1.
Formally:
x̂ =
{
1
t
(sA − pA) if 1t (sA − pA) < 1,
1 otherwise.
Proposition 3 derives the separating condition and show the equilibrium
for the full coverage case.
Proposition 3. (Formalization of Proposition 1) If sA ≥ 2t it is optimal
for the monopolist to set p∗A = sA − t. The consumer at x = 1 derives a
utility 0 from buying the application.
Proof. Substituting pA = p
∗
A and x = 1 into excess utility
vA − v0 = sA − pA − tx
yields
vA − v0 = 0.
Therefore, for p∗A = sA − t the consumer at x = 1 is just indifferent
between buying and not buying. Demand is hence 1 and profits are
π∗A = p
∗
A = sA − t.
It doesn’t pay off to choose a lower price plA < p
∗
A because demand cannot
be larger than 1 and profits are hence
πlA = p
l
A < p
∗
A = π
∗
A.
It doesn’t pay off either to choose a higher price phA > p
∗
A. For a higher price
demand would be less than 1:
x̂ =
sA − pA
t
.
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Profits would be
πhA = p
h
A
sA − phA
t
.
The derivative of the profit function is
∂πhA
∂phA
=
sA
2
− pA.
At phA = p
∗
A (and hence at x̂ = 1) the derivative is
∂πhA
∂phA
∣
∣
∣
∣
ph
A
=p∗
A
= t − sA
2
.
If sA ≥ 2t the derivative of the profit function is non-positive at phA = p∗A and
decreasing in phA, therefore, π
h
A ≤ π∗A and the firm isn’t willing to increase
its price.
For the case where sA ≤ 2t the monopolist sells only to a part of the
consumers.
His profit maximization problem is
π∗A = max
pA
pAx̂ = max
pA
pA
sA − pA
t
.
Solving the first order condition for pA yields
p∗A =
sA
2
.
The location of the marginal consumer and profits are hence
x̂∗ =
sA
2t
π∗A =
s2A
4t
.
Consumer surplus is
EU =
∫ x̂∗
0
(sA − pA − tx)dx =
s∗A
8t
.
B ALTERNATIVE CASES OF COMPETITION 34
B Alternative Cases of Competition
Five cases can be distinguished in a fixed location Hotelling setup: 1. an
“inner equilibrium” (sA + sB > 3t and −3t < sA − sB < 3t, see Fig. 12(a)),
2. market domination by A (sA + sB > 3t and sA − sB ≥ 3t, Fig. 12(b)),
3. market domination by B (sA + sB > 3t and sA − sB ≤ −3t, Fig. 12(c)),
4. two local monopolies (sA + sB ≤ 2t, Fig. 12(d)) and 5. a “limiting case”
where prices are too low for a local monopoly, but too high for competition
(2t < sA + sB ≤ 3t, Fig. 12(e)).
x̃Ax̃B0 1x̃
(a) “Inner Equilibrium”
x̃B0 x̃
(b) A captures whole market
(x̃ = 1)
x̃Ax̃ 1
(c) B captures whole market
(x̃ = 0)
x̃A x̃B0 1
(d) Local Monopolies
x̃0 1
(e) “Limiting Case”
(x̃ = x̃A = x̃B)
Figure 12: Different cases in a Hotelling setup. The vertical axis on the left
denotes the excess utility vA − v0 derived from the usage of application A,
the vertical axis on the right denotes the excess utility vB − v0 from B.
We will derive these conditions and the equilibria arising in the different
cases.
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We will denote the consumer indifferent between applications A and
B with x̃, the consumer indifferent between buying application A and not
buying any application with x̃A and the consumer indifferent between B and
not buying with x̃B. Formally:
sA − pA − tx̃ = sB − pB − t(1 − x̃)
sA − pA − tx̃A = 0
sB − pB − t(1 − x̃B) = 0.
Regrouping yields
x̃ =
1
2
+
1
2t
(sA − sB + pB − pA) (45)
x̃A =
1
t
(sA − pA) (46)
x̃B = 1 −
1
t
(sB − pB). (47)
We will call the demand for application A xA and the demand for appli-
cation B (1 − xB) where
xA =











0 if x̃ < 0,
1 if x̃ > 1,
x̃A if x̃A < x̃,
x̃ otherwise,
(48)
and
xB =











0 if x̃ < 0,
1 if x̃ > 1,
x̃B if x̃B > x̃,
x̃ otherwise.
(49)
The five cases can be formally defined as follows:
• “Inner Equilibrium”: x̃B < x̃A and 0 < x̃ < 1
• Domination by A: x̃ ≥ 1
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• Domination by B: x̃ ≤ 0
• Local Monopolies: x̃A < x̃B
• “Limiting Case”: x̃ = x̃A = x̃B
The following propositions state the conditions for the cases and the
resulting equilibria. As in the main section, we will use ∆ as a shorthand
for sA − sB.
Proposition 4. If sA + sB > 3t and −3t < ∆ < 3t there is an “inner
equilibrium” (x̃B < x̃A and 0 < x̃ < 1) with equilibrium prices p
∗
A = t+∆/3
and p∗B = t − ∆/3.
Proof. Substituting p∗A and p
∗
B into x̃A and x̃B yields
x̃∗A =
2sA + sB
3t
− 1, x̃∗B = −
2sB + sA
3t
+ 2.
The condition x̃B < x̃A becomes thus
−2sB + sA
3t
+ 2 <
2sA + sB
3t
− 1
⇔
3t < sA + sB
which is fulfilled by assumption.
Substituting p∗A and p
∗
B into x̃ we get
x̃ =
1
2
+
∆
6t
.
The condition 0 < x̃ < 1 can be rewritten as
0 <
1
2
+
∆
6t
< 1
⇔
−3t < ∆ < 3t
which is again fulfilled by assumption.
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Because both x̃B < x̃A (and thus x̃B < x̃ < x̃A) and 0 < x̃ < 1 hold we
can write the demand functions specified in (48) and (49) as
xA = x̃ and 1 − xB = 1 − x̃.
The Nash equilibrium is hence
p∗A = arg max
pA
pAx̃(pA, p
∗
B)
p∗B = arg max
pB
pB(1 − x̃(p∗A, pB)).
Solving the first order conditions of the two maximization problems for pA
and pB yields
p∗A = t +
∆
3
p∗B = t −
∆
3
.
Proposition 5. If sA+sB > 3t and ∆ ≥ 3t A will capture the whole market
(x̃ ≥ 1) and equilibrium prices are p∗A = sA − sB − t and p∗B = 0.
Proof. Substituting p∗A and p
∗
B into x̃ yields
x̃∗ =
1
2
+
1
2t
(sA − sB + p∗B − pA∗)
⇔
x̃∗ = 1.
B has no incentive to deviate from p∗B = 0: with a negative price his
profits would be non-positive, with a higher price his demand would remain
zero.
A has no incentive to deviate either. With a lower price his demand
would still be 1, therefore, his profits would decrease.
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The reason why he wouldn’t set a higher price is the following. At
pA = p
∗
A = sA − sB − t the derivative of the profit function is
∂πA
∂pA
∣
∣
∣
∣
pA=sA−sB−t
=
[
1
2
+
sA − sB − 2pA
2t
]
pA=sA−sB−t
=
3t − (sA − sB)
2t
.
The derivative is non-positive at p∗A for sA−sB ≥ 3t and linearly decreasing
in pA. Therefore, A has no interest in increasing the price.
Proposition 6. If sA + sB > 3t and ∆ ≤ −3t B will capture the whole
market (x̃ ≤ 0) and equilibrium prices are p∗A = 0 and p∗B = sB − sA − t.
Proof. By analogy to Proposition 5.
Proposition 7. If sA + sB < 2t there are local monopolies (x̃A < x̃B) and
equilibrium prices are p∗A = sA/2 and p
∗
B = sB/2.
Proof. Substituting p∗A and p
∗
B into x̃A and x̃B yields
x̃A =
sA
2t
, x̃B = 1 −
sB
2t
.
Substituting this into x̃A < x̃B gives
sA
2t
< 1 − sB
2t
⇔ sA + sB < 2t,
which is fulfilled by assumption.
x̃ has to be between x̃A and x̃B
x̃A ≤ x̃ ≤ x̃B.
Therefore, we can write demand as
xA = x̃A and 1 − xB = 1 − x̃B.
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The two local monopolists do not compete with each other, hence the two
firms maximize profits independently
π∗A = max
pA
pAx̃A(pA)
π∗B = max
pB
pB(1 − x̃B(pB)).
Solving the first order conditions gives
p∗A =
sA
2
, p∗B =
sB
2
.
When neither of the aforementioned cases occurs (2t ≤ sA + sB ≤ 3t),
we have the “limiting case” with x̃ = x̃A = x̃B.
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